Trial News

A welder who was injured while working on a jacked-up offshore oil rig is not considered a “seaman” under the Jones Act for purposes of bringing a negligence claim against his employer, the Fifth Circuit has held. The court found that the plaintiff did not meet the second prong of the test for qualifying as a seaman because his work on the rig did not expose him to the perils of the sea in a “substantial” manner. (Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, LLC, 2020 WL 1161765 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2020).)

Gilbert Sanchez worked as a welder for Smart Fabricators of Texas, LLC, on a jacked-up offshore oil rig. He had been employed by the defendant for 67 days—65 of which he spent on the oil rig—when he tripped on a pipe welded to the deck of the rig. Sanchez sued Smart Fabricators in Texas state court for negligence under the Jones Act. The case was removed to the Southern District of Texas, which declined to remand the case to state court and granted the defendant summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish that he was considered a seaman under the Jones Act. If the plaintiff did not qualify as a seaman, his only recourse would be to pursue a workers’ compensation claim against the defendant.

The Fifth Circuit noted that the Jones Act was enacted to address the unique situations of people who work in maritime settings, including “marine-adjacent work.” The core hurdle to qualify as a seaman under the law is “whether the employee ‘face[s] regular exposure to the perils of the sea.’” A two-prong test from the U.S. Supreme Court (Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995)) lays out who qualifies as a seaman: the worker’s duties must “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishments of its mission” and the worker has “a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”

In Sanchez’s case, both parties agreed that he satisfied the first prong, but the defendant disputed whether the plaintiff met the second prong. The court agreed with the defendant, finding that the plaintiff failed the “substantial nature” element of the second prong because he worked on the rig only when it was “jacked up on the sea floor,” meaning that it was not in contact with the water. The inquiry, the court explained, must focus on “whether the employee’s duties take him to sea.” The court reasoned that the jacked-up arrangement meant that the plaintiff’s workspace was flat and stable and not subject to the perils of the sea, which the Jones Act requires.

The Fifth Circuit distinguished its analysis of Sanchez’s work environment from its 2014 ruling in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC (744 F.3d 925). In Naquin, the plaintiff was a vessel repair supervisor who spent most of his time aboard boats that “were moored, jacked up, or docked” in the shipyard. He was injured while operating a crane, and a jury awarded him damages under the Jones Act. On appeal, his employer argued that Naquin was not subject to the perils of the sea because he worked in the shipyard. But the court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiff’s workspace was still “subject to the vicissitudes of a navigable waterway—close to land though it may have been.”

Sanchez, by contrast, did not operate any cranes or the jacked-up legs for the rig, and he was injured by a pipe welded to the rig, which the court determined was unrelated to any perils of the sea.

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